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I. INTRODUCTION 
Minor changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
1
 occur 
regularly, and electronic discovery (―e-discovery‖) has been a source 
of these changes.
2
  As a result of the electronic age, standard me-
thods of procedure in the business industry have changed.  These 
changes have impacted the legal profession—especially e-discovery.  
On September 20, 2005, the Judicial Conference of the United States 
  
 * Ahunanya Anga is an Assistant Professor of Law at Thurgood Marshall 
School of Law.  The author has experience in personal injury litigation and re-
search.  The author thanks God, her husband, Kenneth Anga, for his constant sup-
port, her friends, Edieth Wu, for her relentlessness and candid critique of an earlier 
draft of this paper, and Faith Jackson, for her quiet encouragement along the way. 
 1. See generally FED. R. CIV. P.  The 1938 rules provided for broad discovery 
and were expanded in 1946 and 1970.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37.  Subsequent 
amendments to the rules occurred in 1980, 1983, 1993, and 2000 to curtail discov-
ery abuses.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 advisory committee‘s notes. 
 2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34.  An amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure addressing discovery of electronically stored information went into effect on 
December 1, 2006.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee‘s notes (2006). 
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approved amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
3
 that 
unequivocally tackle a party‘s discovery obligations with respect to 
electronic documents.
4
  ―Electronic discovery‖ refers to the discov-
ery of electronic documents and data, which includes ―e-mail, web 
pages, word processing files, computer databases, and virtually any-
thing that is stored on a computer‖ or device that can store electronic 
information in some form.
5
  ―Electronic data‖ includes all data that 
exists in a form that requires the use of a computer to view.
6
  Com-
puter hard drives, servers, cell phones, palm devices, and a host of 
other electronic devices have become the standard for conducting 
business.  Since these devices have the capacity to store, send, and 
retrieve information, they have become the focus of the trial process 
as it relates to discovery. 
―The impact of electronic data on modern litigation can hardly be 
overstated,‖7 because, as of 2006, more than 90% of information was 
created and stored electronically.
8
  As a result, courts have been 
grappling with issues of electronic data discovery without clear 
guidance from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Courts have 
even been reluctant to manage e-discovery through any detailed 
standards.
9
  This is because ―[b]road discovery is a cornerstone of 
the litigation process contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.‖10  The rules are accorded broad treatment to engender 
  
 3. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, 
AGENDA E-18, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at 21–35 (2005), available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-
2005.pdf. 
 4. See Patricia A. Bronte, Managing Electronic Discovery Successfully in In-
surance Coverage Litigation, 758 PRACTISING L. INST., LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC.: 
LITIG. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 55, 64 (2007). 
 5. Hon. Ronald J. Hedges, Discovery of Digital Information, 747 PRACTISING 
L. INST., LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC.: LITIG. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 41, 47 (2006). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Steven C. Bennett & Cecilia R. Dickson, E-Discovery May Be a Job for 
Special Masters: They Might Show a Way Around the Complexities Inherent in the 
Process, NAT‘L L.J., July 17, 2006, at S5. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. Jones v. Goord, No. 95 Civ. 8026 (GEL), 2002 WL 1007614, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2002). 
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the mutual knowledge of all relevant facts, thereby allowing parties 
to flesh out their claims with minimal burden.
11
  The outrageous in-
crease in the quantity of discoverable information is problematic and 
has impeded a litigant‘s wherewithal to conduct broad discovery.12  
The uniqueness of electronic documents has significantly changed 




The increase in e-discovery, e-discovery‘s impact on litigation, 
and the courts‘ unavoidable role in defining the limits of discovery 
led to the author‘s decision to develop this article.  The availability, 
accessibility, and requestability of electronic data, resulting in in-
creased e-discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is an 
important issue that will affect the legal profession and its constitu-
ents in many ways for years to come.  Part II of this article is an 
overview of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f).  This part stresses 
that in recognizing the herculean task involved in e-discovery, courts 
expect that litigants immediately begin the process of understanding 
what their cases require from an e-discovery standpoint.  
 Part III highlights judges and cases that have had a clear hand in 
shaping the terrain of where electronic data discovery issues are 
heading.  Part IV examines the ramifications of failing to comply 
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f), illustrating the impor-
tance of Rule 26(f) in the litigation process.  Abiding by the agree-
ments that the parties reach under Rule 26(f) could avoid most, if not 
all, e-discovery problems.  Part V examines problems associated 
with electronic data discovery.  Part VI offers workable solutions to 
electronic data discovery concerns.  Finally, Part VII concludes that 
even though the outer boundaries of e-discovery may be uncertain, 
judges, practitioners, and law schools must work together to ensure 
that exposure, training, and classes are available from the earliest 
possible time to ensure efficient and responsible adherence to the 
new requirements that the electronic age has brought to the litigation 
process. 
  
 11. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). 
 12. See Rowe Entm‘t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing cost shifting in the production of electronic evi-
dence). 
 13. See Bronte, supra note 4, at 60. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26(F) 
The December 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure set out specific ways for litigants to deal with discovery 
issues relating to electronically stored information (―ESI‖).14  The 
new rules create a solid structure for lawyers to handle electronic 
documents starting from the beginning of the litigation process.
15
  
Courts have never been in the business of worrying about discovery 
minutiae.
16
  The very nature of the litigation process makes it diffi-
cult to get parties to agree on anything.  The legal profession gener-
ally, and litigation particularly, has become progressively cut throat 
and adversarial to such an extent that the litigation process has be-
come bogged down with parties that are gridlocked and unable to 




Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) addresses the issue of pre-
trial conferences,
18
 while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) ad-
dresses the issue of scheduling.
19
  During the pretrial conference, 
Rule 26(f) requires parties to reach agreements on how, when, and in 
what manner to produce ESI.
20
  The pretrial conference, often called 
the ―meet and confer‖ conference,21 is intended to thoroughly hash 
out issues between parties that would otherwise be impossible with-
out court supervision.
22
  The pretrial conference also sets up methods 
for the production of information, preservation of information, and 
timelines for completion of the discovery process.
23
  Rule 26(f) re-
quires that parties discuss and agree early on in the discovery 
  
 14. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34.  An amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure addressing discovery of ESI went into effect on December 1, 2006.  See FED. 
R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee‘s notes (2006). 
 15. Jason Krause, E-Discovery Gets Real, 93 A.B.A. J. 44, 46 (Feb. 2007).   
 16. See Bennett & Dickson, supra note 7, at S5. 
 17. See Krause, supra note 15, at 47. 
 18. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
 19. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b). 
 20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
 21. Krause, supra note 15, at 47. 
 22. See id. at 47–48 (discussing possible court sanctions for parties that fail to 
comply with discovery agreements).   
 23. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B). 
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process about the preservation and production of ESI, setting out the 
scope of each party‘s rights and obligations.24  Further, Rule 26(f) 
directs parties to confer on ―any issues about disclosure or discovery 
of ESI, including the form or forms in which it should be pro-
duced.‖25  The 2006 amendments to Rule 26(f) direct parties to dis-
cuss discovery of ESI during their discovery-planning conference.
26
  
Rule 26(f) is intended to work in conjunction with Rule 16(b).  
According to Rule 26(f), ―the parties must confer as soon as practic-
able—and in any event at least 21 days before a scheduling confe-
rence is held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b)‖27 to 
―consider the nature and basis of their claims and defenses and the 
possibilities for promptly settling or resolving the case.‖28  Particu-
larly where complex litigation is involved, the new rules fully recog-
nize the importance and necessity of starting e-discovery immediate-
ly.  Through the rule amendments, the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure Advisory Committee also sought to address the potential for 




The 2006 amendments specifically addressed discovery of ESI 
and brought about, at least on paper, uniformity of application that 
has been long overdue.
30
  The amendments added discovery of ESI 
as a possible subject in a pretrial scheduling order
31
 and included 
ESI as a category of material subject to initial discovery disclo-
  
 24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f); see also THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA 
PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING 
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 21 (2d ed. 2007). 
 25. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C). 
 26. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C).  This change in the rules made it imperative for 
litigants to start early in any litigation involving e-discovery. 
 27. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(1). 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2). 
 29. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
83–86 (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/ 
rules/Reports/CV5-2005.pdf (discussing the importance of an amendment to Rule 
37(f), which later became Rule 37(e)); see also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON 
RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 3, at 21–35. 
 30. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, 45 advisory committee‘s notes (2006). 
 31. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii). 
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sures.
32
  Furthermore, the amendments provided explicit procedures 
for a party to resist production of ESI that is ―not reasonably access-
ible because of undue burden or cost,‖ subject to a showing of ―good 
cause‖ for its production,33 and required an early conference between 
the parties to discuss preservation and discovery of ESI and inadver-
tent disclosure of privileged documents.
34
  The amendments also 
addressed the specific procedure for resolving a claim of inadvertent 
production of privileged information,
35
 clarified that interrogatories 
may be answered by reference to ESI,
36
 permitted the requesting 
party to ―specify the form or forms in which [ESI] is to be pro-
duced,‖37 subject to an objection by the producing party, and re-
quired the production of ESI either as it is ―ordinarily maintained or 
in a reasonably usable form or forms,‖ specifying that ESI need not 
be produced in more than one form.
38
  The amendments provided a 
―safe harbor‖ that precludes sanctions, except in ―exceptional cir-
cumstances,‖ for failing to produce ESI that was deleted in accor-
dance with the ―routine, good-faith operation of an electronic infor-
mation system.‖39  Lastly, the amendments conformed the subpoena 




Paper discovery and e-discovery are different in form; thus, the 
old civil procedure rules temporarily accommodated both forms of 
discovery.  The amendments merely codified the concepts and pro-
cedures that many courts developed and used prior to December 
2006.
41
  However, the amendments are expected to be widely 
adopted by state courts as well.
42
  As of 2008, seven states have 
adopted e-discovery rules closely related to the Federal Rules of Civ-
  
 32. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
 33. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 34. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. Form 35 (―Report of Parties 
Planning Meeting‖). 
 35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5). 
 36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 33(d). 
 37. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(C). 
 38. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii). 
 39. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 40. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45. 
 41. Bronte, supra note 4, at 65. 
 42. Krause, supra note 15, at 46. 
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il Procedure, and another fourteen states are considering changes in 
their court rules to address e-discovery.
43
  In the meantime, federal 
judges continue to define and refine the application of the e-
discovery rules. 
III. JUDGES AND CASES SHAPING E-DISCOVERY  
Prior to the adoption of the new Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, federal judges were handling e-discovery issues.
44
  The judges 
who presided over four seminal cases that dealt with e-discovery 
issues are viewed as the ―rock stars of their professions.‖45   
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC
46
 concerned an employment dis-
crimination case where cost shifting for the production of ESI was at 
issue.
47
  The Southern District of New York navigated the difficult 
task of refining and modifying certain aspects of an eight-factor ba-





  Judge Scheindlin in Zubulake determined 
  
 43. Craig Ball, Piecing Together the E-Discovery Plan: A Plaintiff‟s Guide to 
Meet and Confer, TRIAL, June 2008, at 22 n.3 (―[S]even states have adopted e-
discovery rules hewing closely to the federal rules (Arizona, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, and Utah); another 14 states are considering 
changes to their court rules to address e-discovery.‖).  These fourteen states in-
clude Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington.  Brett 
Burney, Mining E-Discovery Stateside, L. TECH. NEWS, Jan. 18, 2008, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=12005946021
61. 
 44. See Jason Krause, Rockin‟ Out the E-Law, 94 A.B.A. J. 48, 48 (July 2008). 
 45. Id. at 49. 
 46. 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 47. See id. at 312–17. 
 48. 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 49. See Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 321–24.  The court in Rowe Entertainment, Inc. 
determined that the plaintiffs should bear cost of restoring e-mails they had re-
quested and which were stored on backup tapes.  205 F.R.D. at 433.  In reaching 
its determination, the court used an eight-factor test: 
(1) the specificity of the discovery requests; (2) the likelihood of disco-
vering critical information; (3) the availability of such information from 
other sources; (4) the purposes for which the responding party maintains 
the requested data; (5) the relative benefit to the parties of obtaining the 
information; (6) the total cost associated with production; (7) the relative 
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that under the analysis and test in Rowe Entertainment, Inc., cost 
shifting inappropriately favored the requesting party in the produc-
tion of electronic data and failed to take into consideration factors 
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 such as the amount 
in controversy and what is at stake in the litigation.
50
  Judge Schein-
dlin noted that a litigation culture that shifts discovery production 
costs to the requesting party would likely end nearly all litigation.
51
  
Building upon Rowe Entertainment, Inc., the Zubulake court revised 
the eight-factor test into seven factors.
52
  The seven-factor test is an 
objective method for determining who should bear the costs of pro-
ducing ESI and is more in tune with the U.S. Supreme Court‘s in-
struction ―that the presumption is that the responding party must bear 
the expense of complying with discovery requests.‖53 
Additionally, in Thompson v. United States Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development,
54
 the District of Maryland extended 
judges‘ traditional sanction authority.55  The parties were enmeshed 
in e-discovery battles and the court sanctioned the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for failing to preserve e-
mail records of housing officials who left HUD before resolving the 
lawsuit.
56
  Further, the district court sanctioned HUD for failing to 
  
ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so; and (8) 
the resources available to each party.   
Id. at 429. 
 50. See Zubulake, 271 F.R.D at 320–21. 
 51. See id. at 317. 
 52. The revised seven factors to be considered in cost shifting include:  
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover re-
levant information; 2. The availability of such information from other 
sources; 3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in con-
troversy; 4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources 
available to each party; 5. The relative ability to each party to control 
costs and its incentive to do so; 6. The importance of the issues at stake 
in the litigation; and 7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining 
the information.   
Id. at 322. 
 53. Id. at 317 (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 
(1978)). 
 54. 219 F.R.D. 93 (D. Md. 2003). 
 55. See id. at 104–05. 
 56. See id. at 99–100. 
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timely produce numerous e-mail records.
57
  Attorneys must remem-
ber that a court‘s inherent power to sanction extends to e-discovery 
infractions, which may have dire consequences to litigants. 
Two years later, in Hopson v. Mayor & City Counsel of Balti-
more,
58
 the District of Maryland maneuvered the parties through the 
issue of the potential waiver of privilege during production of elec-
tronic data evidence.
59
  The new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
recognize the probability that parties will inadvertently produce pri-
vileged documents in the attempt to comply with e-discovery re-
quests.
60
  However, the ―clawback‖ provision in Rule 26 essentially 
allows parties to assert a ―non-waiver‖ agreement so that, if privi-
leged information is inadvertently produced during production of 
ESI, the information will remain privileged.
61
  The ―clawback‖ pro-
vision protects the attorney-client privilege, work product privilege, 
and the client‘s economic interest, which could be compromised by 
inadvertent exposure. 
Further broadening the e-discovery rule application, in United 
States v. O‟Keefe,62 the district court for the District of Columbia 
utilized Rule 34(b) to resolve form issues relating to the production 
of electronic evidence in a criminal case.
63
  The court held that if the 
requesting party failed to specify the form in which electronic evi-
dence should be produced, the responding party must produce, or at 
  
 57. See id. at 104–05 (holding that sanctions were appropriate where the defen-
dant produced 80,000 responsive e-mail records well after the discovery cut-off 
deadline).  The court amended an earlier sanctions order against the defendant by 
precluding the defendant from introducing into evidence the newly discovered e-
mails and allowing the plaintiff to use the newly discovered e-mails in its case and 
during cross examination of the defendant‘s witnesses.  See id. 
 58. 232 F.R.D. 228 (D. Md. 2005). 
 59. See id. at 231. 
 60. See generally id. at 232–33 (discussing the problems of producing privileged 
information when parties comply with e-discovery production requests and how 
the current revisions to the discovery rules alleviate this problem).  At the time of 
Hopson, there was no case within the Fourth Circuit that determined if following 
the procedure proposed by the recommended discovery rule changes would waive 
production of privileged documents.  Id. at 234.   
 61. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B). 
 62. 537 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 63. See id. at 18–19. 
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The opinions penned by these judges are treated like a ―papal en-
cyclical‖65 because ―[t]he law of e-discovery has largely been driven 
by a handful of federal judges who realized early on that electronic 
evidence was going to be a big issue in their courtrooms.‖66  These 
cases addressed issues ranging from the scope of producing and pre-
serving electronic information, cost sharing and shifting for evidence 
produced, and waiver of privilege, to sanctions for failing to preserve 
electronic evidence.
67
  These cases determined that corporations 
must preserve papers, emails, or other electronic documents as well 
as back-up tapes associated with the anticipated litigation.
68
  Gener-
ally, courts have made very clear that attorneys have considerable 
obligations in conducting e-discovery.
69
  As a result, attorney train-
ing must be conducted not only on the general rules, but also on how 
to preserve, request, and ultimately produce e-discovery. 
IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 26(F) 
When parties fail to comply with electronic data discovery 
guidelines set and agreed to by the parties under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(f), courts will sanction the offending party.
70
  
Failure of a party and/or its counsel to fulfill the obligation to pre-
serve or produce electronic and other evidence is known as ―spolia-
tion of evidence.‖71  Spoliation of evidence can result in civil and 
even possibly criminal sanctions.
72
  The burden to satisfy a spolia-
tion finding can be mere negligence; parties need not act intentional-
  
 64. Id. at 23. 
 65. Krause, supra note 44, at 49 (quoting e-discovery consultant Craig Ball). 
 66. Id. at 48 (quoting Mary Mack of the consulting firm, Fios). 
 67. See Michael P. Zweig & Mark J. Goldberg, Electronic Discovery: A Brave 
New World, WALL ST. LAW., July 2003, at 14. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f). 
 71. Zweig & Goldberg, supra note 67, at 14. 
 72. Id. 
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ly.
73
  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(f) provides for sanctions for 
loss of ESI.
74
  To determine if spoliation of evidence has occurred 
and dismissal is warranted, five factors are considered by a court:  
(1) whether the [party] was prejudiced as a result of the de-
struction of evidence; (2) whether the prejudice could be 
cured; (3) the practical importance of the evidence; (4) 
whether the [offending party] acted in good or bad faith; and 
(5) the potential for abuse if expert testimony about the evi-
dence was not excluded.
75
 
Once a court determines that spoliation of evidence has occurred, 
there are several options available to redress the harm caused to the 
prejudiced party.
76
  A court may dismiss the case, exclude expert 
testimony, or issue jury instructions that raise an inference or pre-
sumption against the spoliator.
77
  Any of the options could very well 
serve a death nail to the litigation.  For example, Southern New Eng-
land Telephone Co. v. Global NAPs, Inc.
78
 involved a dispute be-
tween a telecommunications provider and a licensed telecommunica-
tions carrier.
79
  The defendant willfully violated numerous discovery 
orders issued by the court, lied to the court about its inability to ob-
tain and produce documents from third parties, and withheld and 
destroyed requested documents.
80
  The court entered default judg-
ment against the defendant.
81
  The court noted that such willful dis-
covery infractions not only ruined the plaintiff‘s ability to prove its 
case, but also immersed the court in discovery battles that ―squan-
  
 73. Id. 
 74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f); Zweig & Goldberg, supra note 67, at 14. 
 75. Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 945 (11th Cir. 2005) (apply-
ing Georgia spoliation of evidence law). 
 76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f); Zweig & Goldberg, supra note 67, at 14. 
 77. See Flury, 427 F.3d at 945 (discussing the ultimate sanction of dismissal 
where the plaintiff failed to preserve a vehicle, which was the subject of the law-
suit, resulting in extreme and incurable prejudice to the defendant). 
 78. 251 F.R.D. 82 (D. Conn. 2008). 
 79. See id. at 84–85. 
 80. See id. at 86–90. 
 81. Id. at 96. 
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The three-prong test to determine if spoliation of evidence war-
rants an adverse inference and/or other sanctions is: 1) whether the 
party having control over the evidence had a duty to preserve the 
evidence; 2) the mental culpability of the offending party; and 3) if it 
is likely that the destroyed evidence is relevant to a claim or defense 
of the affected party.
83
  However, if it is proven that the ESI was lost 
in a ―routine, good faith operation of an electronic information sys-
tem,‖ the right to sanctions is not triggered.84 
In 2009, court-imposed sanctions on litigants and counsel in-
creased.
85
  Fifty-two percent of the sixty-one reported e-discovery 
opinions issued by courts during the first five months of 2009 consi-
dered whether sanctions should be imposed.
86
  In 36%, or twenty-
two of these opinions, courts imposed some form of sanction, in 
most cases, because of spoliation of evidence.
87
  A study by Kroll 
Ontrack
88
 of e-discovery opinions shows that for the first five 
months of 2009, as compared to the first ten months of 2008, there 
was a two-fold increase in the proportion of e-discovery opinions 
where courts considered sanctions, as well as a two-fold increase in 
the proportion of e-discovery opinions where the courts imposed 
sanctions.
89
   
Few cases are dismissed where spoliation of evidence is an issue 
because the discovery process is meant to ensure that litigants ―dis-
cover‖ as much as possible about the facts of a dispute.  The effect 
  
 82. Id. 
 83. See Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 107–08 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
 84. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 85. Michael F. Flanagan, 2009 Mid-Year Update on E-Discovery Cases, GIBSON, 
DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP (July 8, 2009), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications 
/pages/2009Mid-YearUpdateonE-DiscoveryCases.aspx. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See generally KROLL ONTRACK, http://www.krollontrack.com (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2010).  Kroll Ontrack is a technology driven services and software com-
pany that recovers, searches, analyzes, and produces data for customers in the 
legal, government, corporate, and financial markets.  See id. 
 89. Flanagan, supra note 85. 
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of adverse inference jury instructions is obvious and often ends liti-
gation because the instruction is too difficult of a hurdle for the spo-
liator to overcome.
90
  However, court findings on discovery issues 
were never intended to end the dispute altogether:
91
  
While dismissals and adverse inferences remain confined to 
cases in which a litigant‘s discovery misconduct is so egre-
gious that the very integrity of the litigation process has been 
impugned, courts‘ growing willingness to apply such sanc-
tions seems to reflect a broadening judicial impatience with 
litigants who do not carefully fulfill their e-discovery obliga-
tions.
92
   
This willingness to award sanctions further supports the author‘s 
position that it is important to train attorneys in how to preserve, re-
quest, and produce e-discovery. 
In Connor v. Sun Trust Bank,
93
 the Northern District of Georgia 
granted a motion for sanctions against Sun Trust Bank for the de-
struction of evidence.
94
  Connor, a vice president level banker, re-
turned to work after taking leave under the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA)
95
 to find her managerial position dissolved, her 
responsibilities removed, and her team disbanded.
96
  Connor alleged 
that Sun Trust Bank‘s actions violated the FMLA.97  The court found 
that Sun Trust Bank failed to preserve and produce e-mails detailing 
why Connor was fired shortly after returning to work following an 
FMLA absence.
98
  The court determined that the spoliation could be 
cured by issuing appropriate adverse inference jury instructions on 




 90. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 91. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511–12 (2002) (discussing 
notice pleading requirements in relation to discovery); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 
U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (discussing broad discovery). 
 92. Flanagan, supra note 85 (quotations omitted). 
 93. 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2008). 
 94. See id. at 1377. 
 95. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54 (2006). 
 96. See Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1365. 
 97. Id. at 1365–66. 
 98. See id. at 1367, 1376. 
 99. See id. at 1377. 
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V. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH ELECTRONIC DATA DISCOVERY 
 
The litigation process has always been, and continues to be, 
mired with pitfalls.  The new discovery rules were adopted to alle-
viate, or at least streamline, the process as it relates to e-discovery.  
Many litigators believe that e-discovery issues have not been re-
solved, but have actually compounded discovery problems in gener-
al.
100
  One major issue that has evolved is the cost on all parties of 
conducting e-discovery: ―Litigation is already dangerously close to 
being a prohibitively expensive proposition for many people,‖101  
and ―[t]he cost of handling the volumes of data now discoverable is 
such that we are getting dangerously close to pushing past that 
point.‖102  Such an outcome is not an intended effect of the new 
rules. 
Nevertheless, electronic data discovery is a growing strain on 
companies, law firms, solo attorneys, and, ultimately, clients.
103
  
Better management of electronic records is crucial for keeping costs 
under control for all parties to the litigation.
104
  With the new Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, ―the first step in any litigation with e-
discovery will be to identify all relevant data sources and for-
mats.‖105  This becomes vitally important when it has been estimated 
that the first-level document review encompasses between 58% and 
90% of total litigation costs.
106
  Because there is so much more in-
formation to discover, discovering all relevant information becomes 
  
 100. See Martha Neil, Litigation Too Costly, E-Discovery a „Morass,‟ Trial Law-
yers Say, A.B.A. J., Sept. 9, 2008, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/liti- 
gation_too_costly_e_discovery_a_morass_trial_lawyers_say/ (discussing litigation 
problems associated with e-discovery). 
 101. Krause, supra note 15, at 46 (quotation omitted). 
 102. Id. (quotation omitted). 
 103. See Stanley M. Gibson, Hit „Delete‟ to Prevent EDD Disaster, LAW.COM, 
Aug. 7, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005488122. 
 104. See id. 
 105. Scott Oliver, The Real Implications of the New Rules on EDD, L. TECH. 
NEWS, Jan. 23, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticle 
LTNC.jsp?id=900005471815. 
 106. Ashish Prasad et al., Cutting to the “Document Review” Chase, 18 BUS. L. 
TODAY, Nov./Dec. 2008, at 57. 
2010 LEGAL RESEARCH IN AN ELECTRONIC AGE 15 
even more expensive.  Yet, ―discovery is not just about uncovering 
the truth, but also about how much of the truth the parties can afford 
to disinter.‖107  Putting a price tag on the truth could prove fatal to 
the institution of litigation in the United States. 
Not only are costs incurred during the battle over e-discovery is-
sues between parties, but there can be additional costs to the litigants 
in the form of monetary sanctions resulting from an attorney‘s fail-
ure to comply with discovery mandates.  Fees and costs are the most 
common forms of sanctions.
108
  Such fees and costs impose substan-
tial burdens—even on litigants who win on the underlying me-
rits




Another cost associated with e-discovery results from specialists 
or experts who are used by parties to explain, produce, or unravel 
difficult issues involving ESI.  In 2006, e-discovery consultant fees 
started at $275 per hour, and costs of collecting, reviewing, and pro-
ducing a single e-mail ran between $2.70 and $4.00 per e-mail.
111
  
Experts in this market estimated that litigants spent over $2.4 billion 
on e-discovery services in 2007.
112
  The e-discovery services market 
is expected to draw $4.6 billion annually in 2010.
113
  The e-mail arc-
hiving market alone is estimated to increase from $1.2 billion in 
2007 to almost $5.5 billion by 2011.
114
  The imposition of sanctions 
  
 107. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(quoting Rowe Entm‘t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002)). 
 108. Flanagan, supra note 85. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See, e.g., Keithley v. Home Store.com, Inc., No. C-03-04447 SI (EDL), 2009 
WL 816429, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2009) (ruling that the defendant was re-
quired to pay $282,970.37 in fees and costs for flagrant discovery abuse of elec-
tronic evidence). 
 111. Ann G. Fort, Rising Costs of E-Discovery Requirements Impacting Litigants, 
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Mar. 20, 2007, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=900005554136. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Lauren Katz, A Balancing Act: Ethical Dilemmas in Retaining E-Discovery 
Consultants, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 929, 929 (2009). 
 114. See Herman Mehling, Emerging E-Discovery Market Grows More Vital for 
VARs, IT CHANNEL PLANET, Feb. 28, 2008, http://www.itchannelplanet.com/ 
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for mishandling ESI is well known by litigators and in-house coun-
sel, so hiring an e-discovery consultant is beginning to look manda-
tory, which is certain to run up litigation costs.
115
  Lastly, the added 
cost of attorney review puts the cherry on top.  These costs further 
illustrate why attorneys must be trained in e-discovery, which is be-
coming a critical aspect of litigation and a critical aspect of an attor-
ney‘s ability to effectively prepare for a case.  Both requesting and 
producing e-discovery are pivotal to the litigation process. 
Expert-mediated conferences will likely increase as courts strug-
gle with the technical specifics of electronic data discovery and the 
exaggerated costs.
116
  ―In large cases, [electronic data discovery] 
expenses alone can dwarf the entire amount in controversy in smaller 
cases; in any size case, [electronic data discovery] mistakes can de-




―Out-of-control discovery, among other issues, is making it diffi-
cult or impossible to pursue many cases that traditionally would have 
been brought, as parties settle or even decide not to pursue litigation 
to begin with because of the expense involved.‖118  In major cases, 
discovery obligations can be exorbitantly expensive due to the ―dif-
ficulty of identifying and preserving electronic communications and 
documents, including e-mail and work done on personal computers 
and electronic devices.‖119 
Another pitfall litigants face is that judges are very serious about 
the meet-and-confer conference.
120




 115. See Fort, supra note 111. 
 116. See Craig Ball, Gazing into the EDD Crystal Ball, L. TECH. NEWS, Feb. 4, 
2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=120 
1864414445. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Martha Neil, OK, Discovery‟s a Problem, But What Can Be Done About It?, 
A.B.A. J. (Sept. 11, 2008), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ok 
_discoverys_a_problem_but_what_can_be_done_about_it. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Craig Ball, Ten Blunders That Stop E-Discovery Cold, L. TECH. NEWS, 
Aug. 10, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp? 
id=900005460047. 
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everything and then ―hide the ball‖ when asked to produce ESI.121  
Litigants who wish to pontificate and posture should not do so at the 
meet-and-confer conference.
122
  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(a) states that initial disclosures during the meet-and-confer confe-
rence should include a ―copy—or a description by category and loca-
tion‖ of relevant ESI.123  To comply with Rule 26(a), litigants are 
required to rapidly identify all relevant ESI data sources and identify 
key players who are likely to have discoverable information.
124
  
Where parties engage in sloppy or cursory discovery production and 
additional sources are added after the fact, judges can and do impose 
sanctions.
125
  Federal courts are quite serious about meet-and-confer 
conferences, and ―heavy boots have begun to meet recalcitrant be-
hinds when Rule 26(f) encounters are perfunctory, drive-by 
events.‖126  In other words, the profession is on notice that e-
discovery is a very serious matter; thus, attorneys must diligently 
prepare to handle e-discovery from every angle or bear the risk of 
incurring judges‘ costly wrath for non-compliance. 
Depending on the complexity of a case and the amount of ESI 
involved, courts will inevitably be burdened with sorting out elec-
tronic data discovery issues by conducting numerous hearings.  
When parties fail to conduct proper meet-and-confer conferences, 
they arrive to the Rule 16 meeting
127
 without having learned any-
thing about the location of electronic records, how such records will 
be produced, or the important players that will be central to the dis-
pute.
128
  To be productive, meet-and-confer conferences must evolve 
into a candid, constructive, and collaborative meeting of the minds in 
  
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii).  
 124. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). 
 125. See Oliver, supra note 105. 
 126. Craig Ball, Ask and Answer the Right Questions in EDD, L. TECH. NEWS, 
Jan. 4, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticle 
LTN.jsp?id=900005499729. 
 127. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b). 
 128. See Jason Krause, E-Discovery Tips from the Bench, L. TECH. NEWS, June 
16, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=120 
2422260266. 
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order to take some of the ―sting‖ and ―gotcha‖ out of e-discovery.129  
A ―[m]eet and confer [conference] requires intense preparation built 
on a broad and deep gathering of detailed information about systems, 
applications, users, issues and actions.‖130  This application is also 
consistent with the initial intent of broad discovery rules.
131
 
The complexities associated with e-discovery, however—
such as identifying electronic data sources, harvesting elec-
tronic data and reviewing and producing data—may require 
some form of judicial intervention.  Courts may become 
bogged down in the details of voluminous electronic data col-
lections, expending large amounts of time to become familiar 
with the minute details of the technology and document-
management issues.  Or courts may address e-data issues in 




Motions to compel discovery and motions for sanctions often draw 
courts into these disputes, which at times can become ―expert battles, 
with various technocrats testifying as to what is conceivable versus 
what is cost-effective‖ and what is accessible versus what is inac-
cessible.
133
  Attorney training may reduce this trend.  If attorneys 
understand e-discovery from the front end (preserving data), to the 
back end (producing data), these battles may be avoidable. 
The adversarial nature of the trial process itself makes resolution 
of electronic data discovery issues more difficult.  Attorneys are 
doing their clients a disservice if they engage in ―counterproductive 
discovery battles.‖134  Clients are affected in two ways: First, by the 
attorney‘s billable hours wasted on unnecessary discovery melees; 
and second, by possible sanctions from judges to the client, attorney, 
or both.  Many jurists agree that the e-discovery rules fundamentally 
  
 129. See Ball, supra note 126. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511–12 (2002). 
 132. Bennett & Dickson, supra note 7, at S5. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Krause, supra note 128 (quoting Cathy Bencivengo, Magistrate Judge for the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of California). 
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[T]he old model of competing motions and adversarial dis-
covery is counterproductive [and] [t]he notion that you can 
go at it tooth and nail and don‘t have to turn over a damn 
thing doesn‘t work.  It‘s great to be a zealous advocate, but 
with electronically stored information you have to be a prob-
lem solver, not a fighter.
136
 
Although many advocates are slow to get this lesson, courts‘ wil-
lingness to impose sanctions that send a clear message to attorneys 
will work in tandem with attorney training to curtail battles and lead 
to attorneys becoming problem solvers. 
In Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Services Co.,
137
 the District of 
Maryland discussed that underlying the entire discovery process is a 
requirement that parties and lawyers involved in litigation cooperate 
throughout.
138
  The court delved into elaborate discussions about the 
role of the adversary system in modern e-discovery times.
139
  It 
quoted extensively from courts and legal scholars discussing the ad-
versary system and proposed that its nature does not preclude, but 
indeed requires, collaboration between the parties to reveal and de-
velop the facts underlying their dispute.
140
  In particular, the adver-
sary system requires litigants to cooperate in discovery so that dis-




The issues of the adversarial nature of litigation and the inability 
of counsel from both sides of the table to come to terms with ESI 
discovery requirements are highlighted by the Sedona Conference 
Cooperation Proclamation.
142
  The Sedona Conference issued the 
  
 135. See id. 
 136. Id. (quoting Paul Grimm, Chief Magistrate Judge for the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Maryland). 
 137. 253 F.R.D. 354 (D. Md. 2008). 
 138. See id. at 365. 
 139. See id. at 361–63. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. at 365.  
 142. See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COOPERATION 
PROCLAMATION (2008), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/ 
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proclamation to announce a ―national drive to promote open and 
forthright information sharing, dialogue (internal and external), 
training, and the development of practical tools to facilitate coopera-
tive, collaborative, transparent discovery.‖143  Judges convening at 
the conference claimed that ―[t]he costs associated with adversarial 
conduct in pre-trial discovery have become a serious burden to the 
American judicial system.‖144  They further claimed that ―[t]his bur-
den rises significantly in discovery of electronically stored informa-
tion.‖145  Compounding the problem, in addition to rising monetary 
costs, courts have also witnessed increased discovery motions and  
―overreaching, obstruction and extensive, but unproductive discov-
ery disputes in some cases precluding adjudication on the merits al-
together.‖146  Opposing counsel must cooperate and promote trans-
parency in the preservation and production of ESI.
147
  Undoubtedly, 
e-discovery training for attorneys can help to alleviate much of the 
adversarial posture of the litigation process and facilitate the cooper-
ation needed to efficiently and successfully complete e-discovery 
obligations.   
―Another issue pertaining to the discovery of electronic data in-
volves the duty to preserve and retain electronic data.‖148  Once a 
party realizes that litigation is probably imminent, the duty to pre-
serve and retain relevant documents is triggered.
149
  Any communi-
  
tsc_cooperation_proclamation/proclamation.pdf.  The Sedona Conference is a 
non-profit charitable research and education organization whose mission is to 
facilitate education regarding ―cutting edge‖ issues in law-related topics including 
complex litigation.  See TSC Mission, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/tsc_mission/show_page_html (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2010). 
 143. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 142, at 1. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Cecil Lynn III & Alexandra Hicks, E-Discovery Rulings: 2008 in Review, L. 
TECH. NEWS, Jan. 9, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArt- 
icleLTN.jsp?id=1202427312737. 
 147. See Craig Ball, Crafting a More Effective Keyword Search, L. TECH. NEWS, 
June 24, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticle 
LTN.jsp?id=1202431693400.  
 148. Tammy Wavle Shea, Discovery of Electronic Data: What Statutes and Case 
Law Say to Do, and Not to Do, 40 HOUS. LAW. 29, 33 (2003). 
 149. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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cation alluding to legal action satisfies the notice requirements trig-
gering the duty to retain and preserve documents.
150
  As important, 
courts nationwide have imposed sanctions for a litigant‘s wrongful 
destruction of electronic data.
151
  Discovery misconduct often en-
compasses a party‘s failure to preserve evidence.152  
Ignorance or mistake is often the culprit behind discovery viola-
tions.
153
  Failure to locate evidence responsive to discovery requests, 
false certifications of the completeness of discovery, and untimely 
production of documents result when lawyers do not take the time to 
understand their client‘s electronic storage systems—which is partly 
related to lack of training.
154
 
Many lawyers do not know, or are not trained on, how to handle 
electronic data issues.  Deciphering ESI requires special tools and 
expertise to see and interpret the information.
155
  Because many old-
  
 150. Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001) (ruling that 
the duty to preserve ―arises not only during litigation but also extends to that pe-
riod before the litigation when a party should reasonably know that the evidence 
may be relevant to anticipated litigation‖); PML N. Am., LLC v. Hartford Under-
writers Ins. Co., No. 05-CV-70404-DT, 2006 WL 3759914, at *5 (E.D. Mich. 
Dec. 20, 2006) (holding that the defendant ―was on notice of the potential of litiga-
tion‖ when it received a letter from the plaintiff informing the defendant to expect 
communication from the plaintiff‘s attorneys); Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 216–17 
(holding that duty to preserve arose before suit was filed because employees of the 
defendant associated with the plaintiff recognized the possibility that the plaintiff  
may file suit). 
 151. See Shea, supra note 148, at 33. 
 152. See, e.g., Keithley v. Home Store.com, Inc., No. C-03-04447 SI (EDL), 2008 
WL 3833384, at *19–20 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2008) (sanctioning the defendant for 
flagrant e-discovery transgressions and advising the lower court to draft jury in-
structions that encompassed the defendant‘s failure to preserve electronic evidence 
three years after the plaintiff threatened litigation and a full year after the com-
plaint was filed); Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 
CA 03-5045 AI, 2005 WL 674885, at *5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005) (finding 
deliberate withholding of discovery and fraudulent assurances to court and oppos-
ing counsel about completeness of production). 
 153. See Bronte, supra note 4, at 63. 
 154. See id. 
 155. See Craig Ball, Steps to Get EDD Right From the Start, L. TECH. NEWS, Dec. 
24, 2008,  http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id 
=1202426995800 (discussing how to handle ―fragile‖ ESI and use of forensic 
examination). 
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er lawyers are set in old ways, they are intimidated by the process 
and only utilize what they know and ignore everything else.
156
  For 
instance, a prevalent practice of many lawyers is to print documents 
or convert them to Tagged Image File Format (TIFF),
157
 then engage 
a multitude of document reviewers to review useless or irrelevant 
documents.
158
  Lawyers are not professionally trained, nor are they 
technically savvy enough, to perform the complicated requirements 
of electronic data searches.  They are not trained to carefully craft 
keyword searches of electronic data or put into place quality control 
testing measures for the information that is gathered.
159
  A lawyer‘s 
experience or competence using existing legal research software 
such as Westlaw, Lexis, or Google only inspires bogus self-belief in 
e-discovery search expertise.
160
  One judge observed that a keyword 
search (for e-discovery purposes) ―entails a complicated interplay of 
sciences beyond a lawyer‘s ken.‖161  Actually, the litigation playing 
field has rapidly changed, and lawyers, like the law, are slow at 
catching up. 
VI. SOLUTIONS TO ELECTRONIC DATA DISCOVERY 
Various solutions to e-discovery issues abound.  These solutions 
are often categorized into pre-litigation solutions and litigation solu-
tions.  Because many avenues are available for potential litigants that 
  
 156. See id. (discussing steps for having a proactive e-discovery plan). 
 157. What is a TIFF File?, WISEGEEK.COM, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-
tiff-file.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).  TIFF contains descriptive information 
about the image and was developed collaboratively by the Aldus Corporation and 
other contributors in 1986.  See id.  TIFF is the ―format of choice‖ for archiving 
important images.  TIFF – Tag Image File Format, SCANTIPS.COM, 
http://www.scantips.com/basics9t.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). 
 158. See Christopher Starr, Strategies in Processing and Reviewing ESI, L. TECH. 
NEWS, Oct. 23, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticle 
LTN.jsp?id=1202425459851 (discussing how to be efficient with ESI document 
review). 
 159. See Craig Ball, Time to Catch the „Science of Search‟, L. TECH. NEWS, Apr. 
24, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp 
?id=900005509556. 
 160. See id. 
 161. Ball, supra note 147 (quoting Magistrate Judge John Facciola). 
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can ameliorate, or at least lessen, the potential quagmire the electron-
ic age has produced on the litigation process, Part VI of this paper 
focuses on pre-litigation solutions. 





  Possible automatic deletion and mod-
ification of electronic documents requires that parties take extra pre-
cautions to ensure preservation.
164
  A company‘s e-mails and other 
electronic documents are often routinely deleted automatically.  
Hold letters and other directives force a suspension of deleting elec-
tronic documents while litigation is pending.  Courts often observe 
that the hold letters, or other orders directing parties to preserve or 
retain electronic records, were instituted as a means of ascertaining 
the extent of sanctions.
165
  Any document preservation plan must 
indicate when and what documents should be retained and the pro-
cedure for preserving or destroying documents once a party has no-
tice that litigation is impending.
166
 
―A party‘s discovery obligations do not end with the implemen-
tation of a ‗litigation hold‘‖ and ―[c]ounsel must oversee compliance 
with the litigation hold, monitoring the party‘s efforts to retain and 
produce the relevant documents.‖167  This is why the most important 
element of a party‘s document retention policy is that the policy be 
executed.
168
  Courts expect parties that have such policies to consis-
tently follow them.
169
  It is better not to have a document retention 
policy at all than to have one that is arbitrarily applied.
170
  However, 
  
 162. A litigation hold letter requires parties engaged in litigation to retain relevant 
documents and immediately suspend the automatic deletion of e-mails and the 
writing-over of backup tapes that may be pertinent to the litigation process.  See 
Bronte, supra note 4, at 63. 
 163. Document retention directives perform the same function as litigation hold 
letters.  Id. at 68. 
 164. See id. at 63. 
 165. See, e.g., S. New Eng. Tel. Co. v. Global NAPs, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 82, 92 (D. 
Conn. 2008) (discussing defendant‘s use of ―wiping‖ software on her computer 
after specifically instructed not to destroy any records from the start of the litiga-
tion). 
 166. See Bronte, supra note 4, at 72.  
 167. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 168. See Bronte, supra note 4, at 71. 
 169. See id. (discussing litigation holds and document retention policies). 
 170. See id. 
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a party that has a stated electronic document retention/deletion pro-
tocol, and adheres to that protocol, will probably survive a charge of 
spoliation of evidence.
171
  Therefore, employees must be regularly 
reminded of document retention policies to ensure compliance.
172
  
This will keep old and new employees aware of the duty to retain 
documents connected to a dispute.
173
 
Because parties can be engaged in litigation for years, retention 
policies should be checked at regular intervals throughout the pen-
dency of the dispute.
174
  A party need only prove that destruction of 
evidence was willful in order to obtain sanctions.
175
  Ensuring liti-
gants‘ compliance and cooperation is paramount to see litigation 
reach the proper disposition.
176
  Thus, hold letters offer a simple me-
thodology to combat the voluminous production and retention of 
electronic documents in the business world as parties prepare for 
litigation. 
Also, lawyers must become familiar with, and have a working 
understanding of, their client‘s information technologies.177  Law-
yers are not expected to be computer scientists or experts in comput-
er systems.
178
  However, lawyers need to have some knowledge and 
competent understanding of ESI.
179
  There is no ―fast-food‖ solution 
to this process.  Lawyers cannot learn about a client‘s computer sys-
tems by embarking on superficial instruction or training through has-
  
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. at 72. 
 173. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(discussing that litigation holds should be periodically reissued so new employees 
are aware of the policy). 
 174. Bronte, supra note 4, at 72. 
 175. See S. New Eng. Tel. Co. v. Global NAPs, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 82, 92 (D. Conn. 
2008) (employee‘s use of ―wiping‖ software on her computer warranted default 
judgment order because such action was intentional, done in bad faith, and suffi-
cient to support an inference that the destroyed evidence was harmful to the de-
stroying party). 
 176. See id. at 90 (discussing the need to prevent undue delays and avoid conges-
tion in the courts). 
 177. See Scott Holden Smith, EDD Training: A Growth Industry, L. TECH. NEWS, 
Nov. 15, 2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTNC.jsp? 
id=900005440471. 
 178. See id. 
 179. See id. 
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ty CLE programs or perfunctorily issued certifications.
180
  In Zubu-
lake v. UBS Warburg LLC,
181
 Judge Scheindlin from the Southern 
District of New York held that attorneys have the ultimate responsi-
bility over discovery, and therefore must actively take part in all as-
pects of e-discovery.
182
  The exponential growth and sheer volume 
of e-discovery in the litigation process mandates that members of the 
bench and bar step up to the plate. 
Special Masters trained in e-discovery issues are ideal to assist 
judges in litigation that involves complex e-discovery issues.  This is 
no foreign concept.  In the Eastern District of Texas, Special Masters 
are used to handle intellectual property cases.
183
  The District is also 
well known for its plaintiff-friendly and speedy disposition of patent 
cases.
184
  In this same vein, Special Masters can be used for quick 
disposition of discovery issues dealing with ESI and can also over-
see a variety of e-discovery issues.
185
  For example, a Special Master 
can assist judges in detecting the location of discoverable material 
based on the litigants‘ computer systems, settle discovery disputes, 
and apportion cost-shifting amounts between parties.
186
  This addi-
tional court monitoring would ensure that attorneys receive a clear 
signal that the court is serious about efficiently handling e-discovery 
issues. 
  
 180. See id. 
 181. 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 182. See id. at 432–36. 
183. See, e.g., Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 490 F. Supp. 2d 749 
(E.D. Tex. 2006).  The plaintiff in Datatreasury Corp. sued Wells Fargo and other 
banks claiming that the banks illegally used paintiff‘s patents for taking and 
transmitting digital images of checks.  Id. at 752–53.  In 2008, the court appointed 
former U.S. District Judge Layn Phillips as a Special Master to manage settlement 
negotiations between the parties.  See Susan Decker, Alberto Gonzales to Help 
„Special Master‟ on Check Patent Case, BLOOMBERG, June 6, 2008, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=abnQSa5RHZsQ. 
 184. This is referred to as the ―Rocket Docket‖ of the United States Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas.  See The “Rocket Docket,” TECH LAWFORUM, 
http://techlawforum.scu.edu/post.cfm/the-rocket-docket (last visited Oct. 30, 
2010). 
 185. See Bennett & Dickson, supra note 7, at S5. 
 186. See id. (discussing the many possible functions that Special Masters can play 
in e-discovery). 
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, adopted in 1937, provides 
federal courts with the option of appointing a Special Master.
187
  
Although courts allocate the functions of Special Masters, parties 
must be given notice before a Special Master can be appointed.
188
  
However, even though the potential functions of Special Masters in 
electronic data discovery and other specialty areas are evident, Spe-
cial Masters are used in less than 1% of federal cases.
189
  The elec-
tronic age of discovery requires technical computer expertise and 
legal training.
190
  Using Special Masters for e-discovery could be the 




Just as members of the bench and bar must rush to the electronic 
training docket, law schools must face the responsibility of ensuring 
that graduates are fully prepared for the real-world practice of e-
discovery.  The sphere of e-discovery is swiftly developing into a 
multi-disciplined field comprised of not only lawyers and judges, but 
also of computer technicians, software developers, vendors, and pa-
ralegals.
192
  Solid training in e-discovery is required for lawyers to 
be competent to represent clients in electronic disputes, but there is a 
gap in the system because no proper courses are available for law-
yers to take.
193
  E-discovery is not taught in law schools; therefore, 
the majority of attorneys have no formal knowledge or training in e-
discovery.
194
  Therefore, law firms are left with no choice but to 




To this end, law schools must begin to introduce courses on e-
discovery into their curriculum in order to expose future members of 
the bar to the issues involved in a digital litigation world.  Lawyers 
need to learn and study e-discovery as if it were a ―brand-new area 
  
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id. (discussing how e-discovery has affected modern-day litigation). 
 191. See Bennett & Dickson, supra note 7, at S5. 
 192. Richard Acello, E-Degree, 96 A.B.A. J. 31, 31 (Jan. 2010). 
 193. See id. 
 194. See id. 
 195. See id. 
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of law,‖ even if they are not directly involved in the process.196  
Lawyers and other legal practitioners must be as expert as possible 
in electronic data issues, and there is an enormous gap between those 
who know the issues and those who do not know anything.
197
  Clos-
ing this gap is vital to the continued practice of law in an electronic 
age. 
As soon as practicable, parties should consult with well-reputed 
electronic data discovery (EDD) specialists.
198
  These vendors 
should provide assistance to attorneys in the areas of ESI and docu-
ment review.
199
  Attorneys must oversee all aspects of the litigation 
process and ensure that the e-discovery team, made up of techno-
crats, paralegals, and other support personnel, are constantly moni-
tored for efficient and accurate document review and production.
200
 
Once parties are notified of litigation, every effort should be 
made to negotiate a discovery protocol.
201
  All document requests 
should include electronic information.
202
  The protocol should be 
drafted so that parties share their methods of storing, deleting, and 
maintaining information.
203
  A ―clawback‖ provision204 should be 
included in the protocol to protect parties when inadvertent privi-
leged electronic documents are produced.
205
  A properly imple-
mented protocol will set boundaries on electronic obligations and 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
The future is uncertain as e-discovery continues to complicate 
the litigation process.  Increased use of e-mail, new scanning capa-
bilities, and the cheap storage costs of electronic documents have 
decreased the use of paper documents.
207
  This evolution has caused 
a large increase in ESI.
208
  Easy document creation has resulted in 
billions of documents and has turned relevant document review and 
production during litigation into a nightmare.
209
  Disputes too often 
revolve around e-mails that show a party‘s wrongdoing.210  Howev-
er, as the cost of researching, retrieving, and producing electronic 
evidence is spiraling out of control, parties must weigh whether law-
suits are worth litigating.
211
  As a result, the prohibitive cost of e-
discovery may be the foremost reason that litigation is moribund.
212
 
Harsh penalties await misconduct in e-discovery practices.
213
  
The ever-growing number of players needed to combat the require-
ments of e-discovery requires that attorneys obtain proper training in 
all aspects of discovery as soon, and as thoroughly, as possible.  ―In 
a crowded, noisy market, too many [EDD] providers are making 
unsubstantiated claims and creating consumer confusion, while con-
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sumers lack effective means to compare technologies and me-
thods.‖214  A technological solution to the problems of e-discovery 
would be a methodology that could allow litigants to identify all re-
levant electronic documents reliably and efficiently.
215
  This solution 
seems a while off.  However, in the meantime, no methodology will 
be successful without appropriate attorney training. 
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